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Abstract
As noted by Turing Laureates Geoffrey Hinton and Yan Le-
Cun (Hinton and LeCun 2019), two elements have been es-
sential to AI’s recent boom: (1) deep neural nets and the the-
ory and practice behind them; and (2) cloud computing with
its abundant labeled data and large computing resources.
Abundant labeled data is available for key domains such
as images, speech, natural language processing, and recom-
mendation engines. However, there are many other domains
where such data is not available, or access to it is highly re-
stricted for privacy reasons, as with health and financial data.
Even when abundant data is available, it is often not labeled.
Doing such labeling is labor-intensive and non-scalable.
To get around these data problems there have been many
proposals to generate synthetic data (Rubin 1993; Peng et al
2015; Patki et al 2016; Li et al. 2017; Neuromation 2019;
Walters 2018). However, to the best of our knowledge, key
domains still lack labeled data or have at most toy data; or
the synthetic data must have access to real data from which
it can mimic new data. This paper outlines work to generate
realistic synthetic data without those restrictions and for an
important domain: credit card transactions – including both
normal and fraudulent transactions.
At first glance it may appear simple to generate such transac-
tions – just formalize a few items of the nature, “Sally sold
slacks to Sue on Sunday.” However, there are many patterns
and correlations in real purchases. And there are millions of
merchants and innumerable locations. And those merchants
offer a wide variety of goods. Determining who shops where
and when becomes daunting. Challenging also is the question
of how much people pay. Inserting fraudulent transactions in
the mix provides a final challenge.
Addressing these many challenges and generating good data
benefits from a mixture of technical approaches and domain
knowledge. Those domains of knowledge include mechanics
of credit card processing as well as a broad set of consumer
domains, from electronics to clothing to hair styling to home
improvement and many more. We also find that creation of a
virtual world depicting people’s commercial lives facilitates
generation of high-quality, realistic data. This paper outlines
some of our key techniques and provides evidence that the
data generated is indeed realistic.
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Although beyond the scope of this paper, our synthetic credit-
card data also facilitates development and training of mod-
els to predict fraud. Those models coupled with the syn-
thetic dataset also provide foundations for designing ac-
celeration hardware, just as GPUs, TPUs (Choquette 2017;
Jouppi et al 2017) and other devices have been used for do-
mains such as image classification, object detection, natural
lanaguage processing, etc.
1 Introduction
As detailed next in Section 2, we use a variety of techniques
to synthesize credit card data and have implemented them in
a 40,000-line code base. A key element of our approach is
an individual consumer so our data generation starts by cre-
ating models of individuals. We then create a population of
individuals, with aggregate characteristics mimic’ing their
distribution in the real population. Our initial efforts are US-
focused, so we broad characteristics are representative of the
United States, e.g. in age, occupation, income, credit scores,
geographic distribution, etc.
A first requirement of such statistics is that they match
the mean and standard deviation of the real population.
Generally census and other data sources allow this require-
ment to be met in a straightforward, albeit sometimes time-
consuming manner. Once we have means and standard devi-
ations for statistics of interest, we select specific values for
individuals by stochastic sampling, generally from a Gaus-
sian distribution.
A fine point, but a key point here is the difference between
the population distribution and an individual’s distribution.
For example, the population (and different subgroups among
it) have distributions for spending on certain categories, e.g.
spending on restaurant meals. Once the mean and standard
deviation of an individual’s restaurant spending is selected
from the population values, the individual spends according
to their personal distribution – and does not redraw from the
population numbers for each purchase. Without this distri-
bution for the individual as opposed to the population, an in-
dividual’s spending would seem to fluctuate randomly with
high, medium, and low spending in proportion to the popu-
lation.
However, there is a larger challenge than getting good val-
ues for mean and standard deviation. That challenge is ob-
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taining accurate cross-correlations between different metrics
for an individual. There are two primary reasons:
1. Pairwise correlations are not available for every pair of
statistics, e.g. haircare spending by US zipcode. Even
transitivity does not provide full or precise data, e.g. when
the correlation between A and B is X, and between B
and C is Y. Some pairs of data have no transitive connec-
tion, but even when they do, combining X and Y generally
yields a wide range for the correlation between A and C.
2. Given generated data for two series A and B – each with
proper mean and standard deviation – data for A and
B must be transformed to create a specified correlation,
while still maintaining the original means and standard
deviations. Thankfully, there are standard mathematical
techniques using singular value decomposition which per-
form this operation (Huber 2017). Unfortunately these
techniques are expensive both in memory and number of
computations. Thus, we also employ more ad hoc tech-
niques in some cases. For example, foreign travel tends to
increase with wealth.
A population of individuals each with their own character-
istics is a start. However, actual behavior of those individuals
must be instantiated. For example, what does a person buy?
When and where do they buy it? How do they buy it, e.g.
cash, a particular credit card, etc? We detail those apsects in
Section 2.
However, broadly speaking we simulate artificial worlds.
People live in particular places, they travel for business
and for pleasure, they don’t work most weekends, they buy
things, etc. To generate data, we log the interactions peo-
ple have in our simulated world. Although we have not yet
taken broad advantage of the capability, our simulation ap-
proach enables generation of heterogeneous data sets that
are almost never available in real data. For example we could
create unified datasets with credit card transactions, loan ap-
plications, travel, callcenter conversations, and medical data.
There are connections between all of these activities: people
may purchase an item and then call to report a problem with
it. They may buy airline tickets and then travel. Medical vis-
its incur expenses that paid by credit or debit card.
As these interplays may suggest, another key component
of our simulation system is state machines. For example, is a
person in the TRAVEL state or the HOME state. The set of ac-
tivities and purchases while at HOME typically are different
than in TRAVEL. Similarly, purchases tend to vary between
WEEKDAYS and WEEKENDS and between MORNING, AF-
TERNOON, and NIGHT. Our simulations use these states and
the transitions between them to generate more realistic data.
This state machine approach couples well with our stochas-
tic selection of values from a distribution described above:
An individual’s activities happen in natural sequence. How-
ever, the activities are not unrealistically mechanical. For ex-
ample, chances are astronomically low that we would gen-
erate a person who pays the same amount for dinner at the
same restaurant at precisely the same minute every Saturday
evening. However, a person may typically eat at restaurants
on Saturday evenings, with one restaurant being a particular
favorite. Furthermore, there may be concept drift (Tsymbal
2004) – behaviors shifting over time. Aside from the peri-
odic shifts noted above and the HOME / TRAVEL distinction,
we model such things as retirement and later, extreme age.
Another essential issue in generating data is accuracy and
fidelity to real behavior. Our general approach to this prob-
lem is to compare synthetic data to easily (and automati-
cally) ascertained properties of real data. For example is syn-
thesized spending on credit cards similar to real spending?
Do people spend on the same sorts of things? Are fraud lev-
els similar? Section 4 provides more details and examples
attesting to the realism of our approach.
Once these automated checks have been done and the sys-
tem is properly configured, human experts can also be called
upon to look at small samples of synthetic data and check
for any issues not detected by the automatic assessment. By
the nature of its sampled approach, this human check can be
increased or decreased depending on the number of people
available and the budget for paying such people. We empha-
size that the measures (such as mean spending per transac-
tion or distribution of spending by merchant type) employed
in automatic comparisons do not require deep learning or
human labeled data.
Synthetic data has other benefits, e.g. it can be generated
in different ways so as to address particular challenges, e.g.
• Improve explainability of results⇒ Generate data with a
desired set of characteristics, e.g. a narrow range, bimodal
values, etc.
• Avoid bias in results⇒ Generate data where two classes
have statistically identical behaviors, and then check if the
outputs of particular models are also statistically identical.
• “Natural data” is sparse or unbalanced ⇒ Generate data
that fills in the sparse areas or provides unrealistically
high activity in a normally under-represented segment.
Our hardware colleagues have been industrious and suc-
cessful in generating chips and systems to accelerate train-
ing and inference, e.g. with GPUs (Choquette 2017) or more
specialized chips such as Google TPUs (Jouppi et al 2017)
or other chips (Habana-Training 2019; Habana-Inference
2019). However hardware has been developed and opti-
mized primarily for learning domains in which there is abun-
dant labeled data, e.g. image classfication, object detection,
speech recogntion, natural language processing, translation,
etc. Learning domains such as credit card fraud that we tar-
get with synthetic data do not have such accelerators. Or at
least hardware designers did not have the performance of
these domains as a primary design consideration – due to the
relative lack of data and models. Synthetic data can change
this situation and broaden the set of learning domains par-
ticipating in the virtuous circle of accuracy and performance
improvements.
2 Synthesized Credit Card Data: Approach
As noted in the Introduction, we generate synthetic credit
card transactions via simulation of a virtual world. 1 That
1For brevity we generally say just “credit cards”, but unless oth-
erwise indicated that designation also includes debit cards and pre-
paid cards.
virtual world has a population of consumers with charac-
teristics such as age, income, and geographic location in
proportion to the overall population of the United States.
(Eventually we hope to extend our model to have consumers
across the world.)
The virtual world also has a population of merchants. Like
consumers, merchants embody many real-world characteris-
tics. For example we model total sales amount by merchant
category. For credit cards, categories are labeled by a Mer-
chant Category Code or MCC. MCC codes range from 0
- 9999.) We model both large multinational merchants like
Apple (MCC=5045) and McDonalds (MCC=5814) as well
as local merchants such as dry cleaners (MCC=7210). The
model has over 300 multinationals, each with many physi-
cal locations and in most cases an online presence. Unlike
consumers, merchants are not limited to the U.S, but are
distributed around the world. (Consumers based in the U.S.
may travel anywhere in the world, and a key component of
fraud detection is separating actual consumer travel and con-
sequent purchases from fraudulent activity.) Altogether our
model has over 16 million merchant locations at which con-
sumers can shop.
Unfortunately a representation that includes only con-
sumers and merchants makes it challenging to determine
specific stores where transactions should occur. Consumers
often shop for specific items, e.g. clothing or groceries or a
necklace. Those items and most others can be purchased at a
broad set of MCCs – from stores like Walmart (MCC=5311)
selling a wide range of merchandise to stores selling a nar-
row range of items like a local jeweler (MCC=5094). Thus,
internal to our virtual world we have created a list GS of al-
most 100 types of Goods and Services that people purchase,
and a mapping from GS to the set of MCCs at which the
goods and services can be purchased. The MCCs then map
to merchants and specific merchant locations.
GS also has other features, e.g. how frequently an item is
purchased. (This frequency is actually a distribution ranging
from the fraction of people who buy the item multiple times
per day to the fraction that buy the only once a decade.)
GS also captures time-of-day tendencies, e.g. that people
are more likely to visit a bar in the evening than the morn-
ing. Similarly GS notes the relative proclivity to consume
an item on weekdays vs weekends and whether at home, on
vacation, or on business travel. Finally each item in GS has
an income distribution – indicating both the likelihood that
people buy the item and the amount they spend on it if they
do buy it. These GS characteristics are then translated into
specific (and different) preferences for each consumer.
However, just knowing tendencies and preferences does
not adequately capture consumer behavior. As noted in the
Introduction, our virtual world includes state machines to re-
flect causal relationships, for example making purchases at
merchants relatively close to the consumer’s current loca-
tion.
3 Synthesized Credit Card Data: Examples
To make these notions concrete, Figure 1 shows sample bi-
ographical data of one consumer (“Leia Butler”). The bot-
tom of Figure 1 notes that Leia has 3 cards. Figure 2 then
Figure 1: Sample Bio of Consumer, “Leia Butler”
Figure 2: Sample Info: Card of Consumer, “Leia Butler”
shows one of the 3 cards (a debit card) generated for Leia.
Finally, Figure 3 shows a sampling of transactions on that
card. These transactions are generated using the stochastic
sampling techniques and state machines described above,
and with the parameters in Table 1 as some of the key in-
puts.
Synthesizing Fraud
A key purpose of generating synthetic credit card data is
to help train models to do a better job of detecting fraud. As
such, the virtual world must include not only genuine trans-
actions between consumers and merchants, but also fraud-
ulent transactions. We have implemented two mechanisms
for fraud:
The first mechanism creates a population of fraudsters
similar to the population of consumers. Each fraudster lives
in a particular place, has particular preferences for items pur-
chased, days of the week when purchases are made, etc.
Each fraudster is also active for a particular time range –
from months to years. This model comports with real ob-
servations on fraudster behavior (Ramzipoor 2018). It also
reflects that for most fraudsters, using cards for false pur-
chases is not a hobby but their job. Like other jobs, fraud is
carried out on a particular schedule and in particular places.
And like other jobs, workers enter and leave the field.
The second mechanism generates fraudulent transactions
at random points in time for each consumer. This random
Figure 3: Sample: Transactions of Consumer, “Leia Butler”
• Mean and Standard Deviation for Cards per Consumer,
Cards per Account, Transactions per Year, FICO Score,
Income, Debt as fraction of income, Credit Limit, Balance
as fraction of Credit Limit, Years Account Open, Years
since last PIN change
• Mean Annual Weekend Getaways
• Mean Annual Vacations
• Mean Vacation Duration
• Mean Annual Business Trips
• Mean Business Trip Duration
• Probability of Foreign Weekend Getaway
• Probability of Foreign Vacation
• Probability of Foreign Business Trip
Table 1: Selected parameters controlling credit virtual world
mechanism could represent a worst-case future scenario
when fraudsters have determined how to randomize their
purchases among stolen cards so that there is little appar-
ent pattern to their purchases. This case represents another
benefit of synthetic data: the potential to get ahead of the
curve of real data, and to determine how well models work
in hypothetical what-if scenarios.
With a population of fraudsters as in the first mechanism,
we also label the generated transactions with the identity
of the fraudster. Using this label for training a model is of
course forbidden: real transactions never come with such la-
bels. However, fraudster labels have two benefits:
• The labels can ease debugging and understanding of mod-
els. If a model does particularly well or poorly identifying
fraud from a particular fraudster, that info can be used to
further tweak the model and improve its accuracy.
• Our generation of synthetic transactions is independent of
the model for detecting fraud. Thus, during data genera-
tion it is not known how quickly a model will detect fraud-
ulent transactions and revoke the card to stop the fraud.
Once a model detects fraud with from fraudster F on
card C, the model can throw away future F transactions
on card C. This capability is not available when training
with real data. If the deployed fraud-detection model de-
tects fraud on C at a particular time, there will be no fu-
ture fraudulent transactions on C. Thus, when models are
trained on real data, they become dependent on the behav-
ior of previous models.
Synthesizing Other Attributes
Another important element of our virtual credit card
world is modeling the chip / non-chip status of credit cards
and debit cards. Chips generating unique transaction identi-
fiers were introduced on a large scale in the U.S. in 2014.
Compared to the previous magnetic stripe technology, the
chip’s unique identifiers make it harder to perpetrate “card-
present” fraud. As a result of (1) this chip technology; (2) in-
creasing numbers of online transactions; and (3) increasing
thefts of credit card information from large online reposi-
tories – online purchases now dominate credit card fraud.
Approximately 70% of fraud in the U.S. now happens on-
line (FederalReserve 2017). Europe adopted chip cards ear-
lier and saw online fraud increase commensurately sooner.
Our model can generate consumers over an arbitrary pe-
riod of time. We typically start in the mid 1980s and sim-
ulate until the present. We model a number of the changes
over this span. For example, online transactions start in the
mid 1990s and gradually grow to present levels. As just
noted, levels of online fraud also increase significantly in
the last few years. Over this long time period, 18-year old
consumers and others also emerge and begin using cards for
the first time. Others retire and their pattern of purchases
change.
Data from such long time periods is unavailable in the
small number of real data sets on which work has been
published (Pozzolo et al 2014; Pozzolo et al 2015; Car-
cillo et al 2018) – yielding another benefit of synthetic data.
Reports about fraud detection using real data have periods
ranging from 2 days to a few months to a one year. However,
many purchases typical of fraud occur at long time intervals.
For example, foreign trips are separated by years for many
people. Expensive purchases such as furniture, jewelry, and
high-end electronics also tend to be purchased relatively in-
frequently. Like travel, these purchases are disproportion-
ately represented in fraud. Thus data spanning long time pe-
riods is important to separating real transactions from fraud.
Our synthetic data has all credit and debit cards of a con-
sumer as well as their cash purchases. Real data sets are typ-
ically limited to transactions from one card or at most one
family of cards (e.g. Visa or Mastercard) and never include
cash. As such, synthetic data provides a means for assessing
how much accuracy is lost due to unavailability of “full” data
sets. A broad set of synthetic data also provides a foundation
for transfer learning and augmenting real data (as opposed to
totally supplanting it as we do).
4 Results
To fine-tune data generation and provide fidelity with the
real world, we look at many population statistics. Table 2
summarizes across the biographical attributes listed in Fig-
Table 2: Summary stats of biographical attributes
ure 1. If the summary stats do not match what is desired, we
can adjust the values in Table 1 and others until the popula-
tion aggregates have the desired values.
Table 3: Summary stats of credit, debit and prepaid cards
Similarly and as analog to Figure 2, Table 3 provides a
summary across the credit, debit, and prepaid cards of indi-
viduals. The numbers in Tables 2 and 3 are indeed reflective
of the broad U.S. population, e.g. roughly equal numbers of
men and women, mean FICO score of 712, mean income,
vacation days, etc.
It is also useful to look at summary statistics on trans-
actions at varying granularities. In particular we look at (a)
lifetime transactions – over the approximately 35 years of
the virtual world in Table 4(a); (b) annual transaction counts
in Table 4(b); (c) annual spending in Table 4(c); and (d) per-
transaction spending in Table 4(d).
The numbers in these tables reflect actual values, e.g. the
amounts of different transaction types in Table 4(d) – for
both fraud and non-fraud. Similarly the usage ratio of credit,
debit, and prepaid cards in Table 4(a) is accurate, as is the
higher rate for online fraud than card-present. We also hope
that readers will find the transactions in Figure 3 realistic.
(a) Lifetime Statistics on Transactions
(b) Annual Statistics on Transactions
(c) Annual Statistics on Spending
(d) Statistics on Spending per Transaction
Table 4: Summary stats: transactions and spending
We tabulate many other statistics beyond the data shown
in these tables, e.g. statistics per U.S. state, per country, and
per MCC, as well as various online statistics. We omit details
here for brevity.
Once input parameters are such that summary statistics
for the generated data match desired values, we can generate
arbitrarily large datasets. We have generated datasets span-
ning 35 years with 20,000 consumers performing more than
300 million transactions. Represented in CSV format, such
a dataset requires over 20 GBytes. Arbitrarily larger datasets
are possible as needs dictate and storage resources allow.
5 Related Work
Many previous works assess fraud-detection models (Bach-
mann 2019; joparga 2016). The largest number have been
built around a public-domain Kaggle dataset (Bontempi and
Lenaerts 2018) with about 280,000 transactions collected
over 2 days. Our transaction count is more than 1000x larger
and spans decades, not days. Unlike our data the Kaggle data
also obfuscates all features except transaction dollar amount
and time. This obfuscation is done via a principal compo-
nents transformation which creates uncorrelated numerical
features. This lack of correlation is unrealistic. Having no
underlying intuitive sense of the features also increases the
difficulty of building models. Capital One has blogged about
their internal work using GANs to generate synthetic trans-
action data (Walters 2018). However their approach requires
access to real data, which is then amplified to create new
data. Our approach requires no access to real transactions.
Other studies have been done on more realistic (non-
public) data sets (Pozzolo et al 2014; Pozzolo et al 2015;
Carcillo et al 2018). However, the time span for these stud-
ies ranges from 3-12 months versus 35 years for our data.
The maximum number of transactions in these previous
studies is around 10 million – less than 1/30-th of the number
in our synthetic data, and we can generate datasets that are
far larger still. As has been observed in other domains, the
quantity of data matters in achieving high model accuracy.
More broadly synthetic data can be viewed as a comple-
ment to techniques such as transfer learning (Pratt 1993)
and few-shot learning (Murphy et al 2003; Bart and Ullman
2005) that learn based on a small set of data. However, in-
stead of having models learn from a small amount of data
or from results in a related domain, our approach generates
data from fundamental principles of how things work and
simulations embodying those principles.
6 Conclusions
We have outlined techniques for synthesizing credit card
transactions for U.S.-based consumers purchasing in the
U.S. and world-wide. We have also provided statistics and
transaction snippets indicating that the results are realistic.
Improvements are always possible. As future work we
plan to support broader populations than the U.S. We also
plan to enhance the state model in our virtual world to pro-
vide yet more realism in individual consumer behavior. We
also plan to examine how GANs (Goodfellow et al 2014)
could systemically improve our data.
Further afield, many techniques outlined here can be ap-
plied to sythesize other types of data. Bank loan applications
have many overlaps as do patient medical records. Medical
records have at least as many privacy restrictions as credit
card data and can also benefit from a virtual world approach
for modeling behavior, disease progression, etc.
Transcripts are available for a large corpus of speech.
However, except in a few cases involving large human effort,
transcripts do not provide the underlying semantic intent of
the words. Synthetic approaches could prove helpful. Auto-
matically interpreting charts and graphs is another challenge
where synthetic data may help.
Aside from new domains and improvements in real-
world fidelity, we plan to investigate improved technical ap-
proaches. For example with thousands of variables, gener-
ating cross-correlations between all pairs is computationally
expensive. Can we improve it?
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